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I.

INTRODUCTION

The articles by Follesdal, 1 Ulfstein, 2 Benvenisti and
Downs, 3 and Nollkaemper, 4 presented as part of the Nineteenth Annual Herbert Rubin and Justice Rose Luttan Rubin
International Law Symposium at NYU School of Law and collected in this issue of the NYU Journal of International Law and
Politics, provide a vivid illustration of the range of normative,
empirical and doctrinal issues raised by the phenomenon of
"crossjudging" that we identified and addressed in our original 2009 article in this Journal (referred to throughout as
Cross-Judgi,ng) .5 The articles show that studying how different
international and regional (and indeed domestic) tribunals relate to each others' rulings and processes can shed light on the
question of the legitimacy of international adjudication, as
well as the ways in which international adjudication has effects
in the world, taking us "beyond compliance"; in addition, stud-

* Respectively, Lloyd C. Nelson Professor of International Law, NYU
School of Law and Ernst Stiefel Professor of Comparative Law, New York
Law School and visiting fellow, London School of Economics.
1. Andreas Follesdal, To Guide and Guard International judges, 46 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 793 (2014).
2. Geir Ulfstein, International Courts and judges: Independence, Interaction,
and Legitimacy, 46 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 849 (2014).
3. Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, Democratizing Courts: How National and International Courts Promote Democracy in an Era of Global Governance,
46 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 741 (2014).
4. Andre Nollkaemper, Concerted Adjudication in Cases of Shared Responsibility, 46 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 809 (2014).
5. Ruti Teitel & Robert Howse, Cross-Judging: Tribunalization in a Fragmented but Interconnected Global Order, 41 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & PoL. 959 (2009).
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ying cross-judging can illuminate some of the dimensions of
the relationship between domestic democratic sovereignty and
international legal order.
II.

THE CENTRALITY OF INTERPRETATION

Andreas Follesdal rightly identifies the central legal task
of international courts and tribunals as that of interpretation;
this is the overall context in which the practice of cross-judging ought to be assessed. The judges, as he writes, face "a complex set of somewhat vague legal norms, standards, and objectives. "6 Instead of attempting to taxonimize international
courts according to specialized regimes and functions, Follesdal rightly argues that we should focus on the common challenge of interpreting complex normative material in individual cases. The very task confounds notions that legitimacy can
be guarded by keeping international courts on a short leash,
controlling narrowly "discretion." Indeed, as Follesdal
shrewdly notes, especially in multilateral regimes, legal evolution through treaty amendment is a "cumbersome" process. 7
Thus, courts have a special responsibility for keeping the treaty
norms meaningful, including in light of the general evolution
of international and related specialized regimes. Cross-judging
plays an important part in the discharge of this responsibility.
Follesdal asks how courts might be guided in the practice
of cross-judging. He correctly notes that when international
courts invoke the decisions of other judicial instances, it is frequently on the basis of the intrinsic persuasiveness of their reasoning. Follesdal worries, however, that unless courts develop
some kind of theory or standard about the suitability of referencing other judicial instances, the choice of sources may appear arbitrary. Here, we believe this risk might be controlled
in a different way, through the explicit explanation of the relevance to the issue before the court of the other instance's ruling. In a Dworkinian fashion, the court ought to provide a conception of the law it is interpreting that defines the universe of
relevant normative material that it will take into account.
This point relates to Follesdal's remarks concerning accountability. We agree with his call for "more publicity about
6. Follesdal, supra note 1, at 796.
7. Id. at 798.
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the actual 'balancing' of various objectives and norms." 8 While
it is entirely meritorious to call for improvements in selection
processes for international judges-as long as there are obvious questions about bias, corruption, or political influence-it
is really the outputs that will matter decisively to the tribunal's
legitimacy.

III.

CRoss:JunGING AND THE SouRcEs
OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

While Geir Ulfstein begins by vetting formalistic, positivist
conceptions of international tribunals as agents or trustees of
states, he quickly proceeds to a broader and more substantive
view of legitimate judicial authority. Ulfstein emphasizes the
importance of international courts following "recognized principles of interpretation in international law" and shows that
international courts play a role in global governance and the
systemic integrity of international law that operates quasi-autonomously from the interests of the particular states that have
created their jurisdiction.9 As we have emphasized in earlier
writing, international courts do not simply address themselves
to states, and their legitimacy and efficacy depends upon the
judgment of non-state actors to a significant extent-including
NGOs, victims of human rights abuses, investors, traders, and
not least members of the professional community of international jurists, which operates increasingly independently of
traditional state institutions such as foreign offices. Since judicial power and the sources of its legitimacy are not the same as
for legislative or executive power, legitimacy may depend significantly upon the recognition that a court is operating in a
judicial way-giving coherent public reasons for its decisions,
acting impartially, following proper processes, and so forth.
Such judgments are understandably the province of other jurists who recognize the court in question as acting in an appropriately judicial way. Indeed, this kind of mutual recognition is
one of the functions that crossjudging plays in the legitimation of international judicial authority. One of the striking aspects of international judicial authority that points to the unreality of a formal delegation model is Kompetenz-Kompetenzthe assertion by the tribunals of the competence to determine
8. Id. at 807.
9. Ulfstein, supra note 3, at 856.
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the scope of their own competences, a characteristic common
to tribunals as different as the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (Prosecutor v. Tadic) 10 and the WTO
Appellate Body (India-Balance of Payments) .11 Courts identify
regime values or goals that make them responsible to nonstate actors: for example, private traders in the case of the
WTO panel S. 301, 12 or the families of the "disappeared" in
the case of the "Right to Accountability" jurisprudence of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights.13
Echoing our observation in previous work, including
Cross-Judging, that there is an important ex-post democratic
control on international courts and tribunals by virtue of the
fact that the meaning and impact of their rulings will be
shaped or reshaped through implementation by domestic authorities, including domestic courts, Ulfstein notes: "National
courts may point to the significance of local conditions or
through well-reasoned opinions try to persuade !Cs [International Courts] to choose a different interpretation. A more
general practice by national courts may amount to subsequent
state practice that !Cs must take into account." 14 This confirms
our view that attention to crossjudging must extend to the interaction of international and domestic courts, a phenomenon
that has not been closely studied hitherto.
Our proposition here is also strongly confirmed by the
analysis of Eyal Benvenisti and George Downs. Theirs is one
effort to apply the basic intuition that crossjudging between
different levels of courts, and not just horizontally between international tribunals, contributes importantly to legitimacy. In
particular, Benvenisti and Downs argue that there can be democratic distortions or accountability deficits both in domestic
regulation and in international regimes, and that dialogue be10. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
11. Appellate Body Report, India-Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of
Agricultural, Textil.e and Industrial Products, WT/DS90/AB/R (Aug. 23, 1999).
12. Panel Report, United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999).
13. See Ruti Teitel, Transitional justice and judicial Activism-A Right to
Accountability? (Aug. 15, 2013), avaflabl.e at http://law.huji.ac.il/upload/ac
coun tabilitytelavivedits. pdf.
14. Ulfstein, supra note 2, at 857.
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tween international and domestic courts can help to counter
these political failures at both levels. But we also note that this
vision of checks and balances extends beyond the dialogue between courts, and also includes that between courts and other
institutions of governance. Here, we strongly agree with their
view that the Kadi decisions of the European Court of Justice,
often considered defensively by international jurists as a threat
to the international rule of law, should instead be viewed favorably, as correcting elements of unaccountability in international decisionmaking (the U.N. Security Council). As
Benvenisti and Downs show, the Kadi rulings and related judgments in other jurisdictions had a tangible effect on the behavior of the Security Council and related political actors, leading
to measures that would create some kind of accountability and
review process in connection with the Security Council sanctions regimes and its blacklisting practices in respect of individuals suspected of financing terrorism. Benvenisti and
Downs also point to the value of ·~udicial efforts to generalize
and rationalize the international legal landscape," giving the
example of linking trade obligations with human rights concerns;15 while specialized, purportedly self-contained regimes
often suffer from the lack of ability of political and bureaucratic actors to speak to one another across regimes (the WfO
and the U.N. human rights organs is a clear example), courts
have a peculiar advantage in crossing these divides by viewing
international law as an integrated system, where norms are interconnected and mediated by evolving principles of the system in general. In this respect, Follesdal is absolutely correct
that international courts should not limit themselves to the
supposed intentions of the drafters of specialized treaty regimes in the way in which they interpret treaties; certainly not
to the point of failing to engage with relevant normative material from other regimes that the drafters might not have anticipated in advance to bear upon the particular specialized regime in question. By choosing the idiom of international law
to effect the governance of specialized areas, drafters of treaty
15. Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 3, at 780; see also ROBERT HowsE &
RuTI G. TEITEL, BEYOND THE DrvrnE: THE COVENANT ON EcoNOMIC, SocIAL
AND CuLTURAL RIGHTS AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Dialogue on
Globalization, Occasional Paper No. 30, 2007), available at http:/ /library.fes
.de/pdf-files/iez/global/04572.pdf.
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regimes make a conscious choice to step outside the parochial
technical idiom of their particular epistemic communities, and
enter a broader normative universe, one increasingly shaped
by considerations of humanity, and the need for human- not
state-centered judgment, regardless of the specialized content
of the norms being considered. 16
While we find many of the insights of Benvenisti and
Downs to be persuasive, and view their article as making a very
significant contribution to understanding both how crossjudging works and its important normative functions, we would
partly dissent from their conclusion that national courts engage with international tribunals from the motivation "of domestic interests and concerns" rather than "utopian globalism. "17 This need not always be the case. In the Kadi casewhich, as noted, Benvenisti and Downs analyze very well-it is
arguable that the fundamental human rights principles invoked by the European Court ofJustice were also fundamental
principles of the international legal system as a whole, including the United Nations itself. Thus, the intervention of the
Kadi court was not ultimately premised upon guarding interests and concerns at the sub-international level, but upon the
affirmation of universal values that had been betrayed by the
United Nations in this case. Nevertheless, we agree with
Benvenisti and Downs that domestic interests and concerns
may be underrepresented in the international law formation
process and that domestic courts can play an important corrective role.
IV.

ARBITRATION

An important issue raised by Follesdal is whether arbitral
tribunals should be regarded as having the same role of systemic integration of international law through crossjudging as
instances that are more apt to be described as courts (and
here we would clearly include, for example, WTO judicial organs in the latter category). Given that in investor-state arbitrations, for example, arbitrators exercise public authority in the
sense articulated by Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke,
where their rulings determine the legitimate bounds of state
regulation, one must question the notion that they should be
16. RUTI G. TEITEL, HuMANrIY's LAw (2011).
17. Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 3, at 791.
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regarded as 'judges for hire" with responsibilities only to the
parties that pay them and not to broader constituencies affected by their rulings. International commercial arbitration
may, of course, require a different analysis. But the narrow
view that some arbitrators take of their role 18 seems not only
blind to the fact that these tribunals in the investor-state context are applying core norms of public international law, and
thus like it or not, are affecting the evolution of these norms
(state responsibility, etc.) but also are quite possibly motivated
by an overriding concern to appear slavishly beholden to those
who pay them, and from whom they want to get paying work in
the future.
V.

PARALLEL AND 0VERIAPPING PROCEEDINGS

Parallel and overlapping proceedings-where claims that
relate to similar or the same subject matters, and in some cases
also by the same complainants are before more than one forum-raise particular kinds of cross-judging challenges. These
are tackled by Andre Nollkaemper. Nollkaemper suggests that
the function of cross-judging in these cases may be rather different or more specific than its general interpretative function
as discussed above (and which was the focus of our original
article). Cross-judging may be a means of preventing conflicting outcomes from different fora in related or parallel disputes or of achieving judicial economy (res judicata of various
kinds: Nollkaemper usually gives the example of the ICJ reliance on fact-finding by the IC1Y in the Bosnia v. Serbia case). 19
We find promising Nollkaemper's invitation to "construe a
principle of comity that should govern the relations between
multiple courts."2° Conceptually, we would ground this comity
on the notion of mutual recognition we discussed above-the
idea that jurists recognize one another as authentic practitioners of judicial authority, associated with the qualities of independence, impartiality, giving of reasons, due process, and re18. SeeGlamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Award (NAFfAArb. Trib.June
8, 2009), availab/,e at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-docu
ments/ita0378.pdf; Follesdal, supra note 2, at 7-8 (quoting Romak S.A.
(Switz.) v. Uzbekistan, PCA Case No. AA2801[ 171 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009)).
19. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.CJ.
47, 1[ 255 (Feb. 26).
20. Nollkaemper, supra note 4, at 845.
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lated features identified for example by Anne-Marie Slaughter
and Laurence Helfer in their classic article in the Yale Law
JoumaL 21 We see this kind of comity as based on the specificity
of right as a form of normativity, and thus different from the
traditional state-centric version of comity between sovereigns.
Finally, Nollkaemper suggests that consolidated proceedings
may lead to better solutions than crossjudging in some situations of overlap, parallel proceedings, and potential duplication, and even conflict. 22 Such proceedings merit closer study,
in a variety of contexts including the WTO, human rights
tribunals, and investor-state dispute settlement (e.g., the collective action of holders of Argentine bonds is a wonderful
case study in the complexities of applying the class action concept in international litigation). 23 Some of the considerations
that may complicate or impede consolidation in individual
cases include the fact that it is rare that a single international
tribunal can hear claims of both states and individuals and that
while having a similar claim against the defending party, different actors may also have competing or conflicting interests
among themselves. For example, different firms affected by
the behavior of a single host state may also be competitors in
global markets, and therefore be very reluctant to have sensitive commercial information shared even among their counsel.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In general, the articles discussed in this Comment tend to
vindicate our questioning in Cross-Judgi,ng that the proliferation of international and regional courts and tribunals must
lead to inherent fragmentation anxiety-a worry that
horizontality and multiplicity may simply increase incoherence
and weaken international law. The issues raised by Cross-Judging are tractable to rational legal analysis and the relationships
between different courts and tribunals can be studied and
their patterns determined and evaluated: Lack of hierarchy
does not mean lack of normative rationality or anarchy.
21. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE LJ. 273 (1997).
22. Nollkaemper, supra note 4.
23. Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07 /5, https:/ I
icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontSeivlet.
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